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TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES OF LISA GRAVESt
1. Has modern warfare rendered the Geneva Conventions quaint?
No. Despite the extreme, reactionary calls of some within the Bush
Administration, "modem warfare" has not rendered the Geneva
Conventions "quaint." Nor has the threat of terrorism done so, a threat
our great nation and our allies have faced throughout history, just as the
threat of nuclear annihilation during the many decades of the Cold War
with the Soviet Union did not render irrelevant our commitment to
honoring human rights. As the Supreme Court affirmed in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, I the Geneva Conventions remain part of the domestic law of
the United States and are applicable to the conflict with al Qaeda, despite
vigorous arguments by the Administration to the contrary.
The Court held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions-which were ratified by the United States Senate-requires
signatories to treat people who are captured in any armed conflict
"humanely," bars "cruel treatment and torture" as well as "humiliating
and degrading treatment," and provides that sentences imposed on
detainees must be pursuant to a "regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples," even if those captured are not wearing the uniform of
a state signatory to the Conventions.2 These are the minimum standards
for prisoners long honored by our nation, which had been the standard
bearer on human rights prior to the secret, unilateral, and dramatic
departures from the rule of law directed by President Bush and Vice
President Cheney with the advice of then White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales.
t Deputy Director of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, DC.
J.D., Cornell Law School, cum laude; B.S. in Political Science, University of Wisconsin-
LaCrosse, with highest honors, 1991. Ms. Graves previously served as the lead lobbyist
on national security issues for the ACLU, and prior to that was the Chief Counsel for
Nominations for the Senate Judiciary Committee. She also served as Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Policy/Office of Policy Development at the
United States Department of Justice, under both Attorneys General Janet Reno and John
Ashcroft.
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. Id. at 2796.
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Some commentators have tried to sidetrack this issue, in part, by
noting that Gonzales technically did not call the Geneva Conventions as
a whole "quaint" when he used that term to refer to provisions affording
prisoners of war (POWs) things like "commissary privileges," meaning
the ability to purchase items such as cigarettes or clothing during
detention. That term has been correctly seized upon, however, as a
catchword for the flip disdain demonstrated by the Administration
toward U.S. legal obligations such as the Conventions. The more telling
but less evocative phrase used by Gonzales was actually his argument
that the "war on terrorism's "new paradigm renders obsolete" Geneva's
limitations on questioning the enemy, which he incorrectly told the
President allowed the U.S. to ask only the name and rank or role of
detainees (on the contrary, Geneva's protections or limitations are about
treatment, not the content of questions). As then-Secretary of State Colin
Powell correctly predicted, the approach taken by President Bush on
Gonzales' advice reversed over a century of U.S. policy, has had a "high
cost in terms of negative international reaction" and cooperation, eroded
public support, and undermined U.S. military culture. 3
It is unfortunate that Powell's advice and the views of uniformed
lawyers, such as the numerous Judge Advocates General, were so readily
disregarded by the White House, which betrayed our nation's
fundamental values through the President's secret orders directing CIA
agents or its contractors to use interrogation techniques that were not
only cruel or degrading but also in some cases constituted torture, and to
render prisoners to other countries for torture based on wink-and-nod
assurances that the prisoner would not be mistreated. To this day, the
Administration denies it authorized "torture," despite evidence to the
contrary from Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and other prisons. The truth of our
real policy is only amplified by the infamous Justice Department memos
by John Yoo and (now judge) Jay Bybee asserting Geneva does not
apply and construing "torture" to allow numerous ineffective and
appalling techniques that readers would rightly consider torture if
imposed on them, such as waterboarding to near drowning, which passes
Yoo-Bybee because the pain caused is not equivalent to organ failure.
Although that part of the memo was withdrawn due to public outcry
upon its discovery years after it was implemented, the Administration
has refused to disavow the severely flawed underlying legal reasoning
arguing for virtually unchecked power for the President.
3. See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989436/.
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2. Is the Justice Jackson concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case
really that helpful in sorting out separation-of-powers questions?
It is helpful and controlling as a legal matter. As a policy matter, it
is unfortunately not sufficient when faced with an intransigent president.
As conservative scholar Bruce Fein, a deputy attorney general in the
Reagan Administration, has said, our constitutional democracy relies on
the leaders of each branch "to exercise some self-restraint." 4 The rule of
law is more fragile than its words imply. We have seen with this
President that an executive determined to act unilaterally and secretly can
substantially subvert the rule of law in the name of national security, and
that the other branches are not well-suited to checking an executive
branch bent on secretly ignoring and thwarting their prerogatives as
coequal branches of our government.
The courts are constrained by the cases brought to them, although,
thus far, the Supreme Court has stepped up to check some of the extreme
arguments President Bush has claimed under his "commander-in-chief"
power, which Vice President Cheney has described as "plenary"-a $3
word for "absolute" or unqualified. We all know well the old axiom by
Lord Acton that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely." As Fein has noted, President Bush's policies-such as his
secret reinterpretations or repeals of laws duly passed by Congress
through his aggressive signing statements-are an attempt by the
President "to have the final word on his own constitutional powers,
which eliminates the checks and balances that keep the country a
democracy.., moving us toward an unlimited executive power."
5
What Justice Jackson did in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer was to establish a way to sort through conflicts between the
political branches regarding presidential powers during times of war or
international conflict, such as the non-declared war in Korea at the time
President Truman seized the nation's steel mills to prevent a labor strike
from limiting steel production. The essence of the repeatedly reaffirmed
test former Attorney General Jackson outlined was that the President acts
at the "zenith" of his power when Congress passes laws supporting his
specific actions and the courts will not likely find such acts
unconstitutional unless the federal government lacks the power agreed
upon by the political branches. When the President acts in contradiction
to the express or implied will of Congress (as President Bush did when
4. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, April 30,
2006, at Al.
5. Id.
2007]
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he ordered warrantless wiretapping of Americans in violation of the
express language of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)),
his claim of power is at its lowest ebb. These are sound guidelines for
navigating the separation of powers.
When the same party-or "interest group" in the words of the
Framers-has captured both political branches, however, the structural
separation of powers can be insufficient to protect liberty, as we have
seen in the first six years of this Administration. It remains to be seen
whether the recent change in power in Congress will result in increased
checks on the excesses of this Administration in the modem world of
attack-dog politics where no one wants to be called "soft on terror," but
one of the greatest powers the Constitution gives Congress is the power
of the purse, if only there is the will to use it.
I urge all students of the law to revisit Justice Jackson's wise and
brilliant analysis in Youngstown. He dealt handily with Truman's claim
of "comprehensive and undefined presidential powers" and rightly called
"loose and irresponsible" the very terms President Bush and Vice
President Cheney have bandied about in defense of their extreme
policies. Former Nuremburg war crimes prosecutor Jackson eloquently
and correctly took issue with the very concept of "implied," "inherent,"
and "plenary" presidential powers as antithetical to those who cherish the
blessings of liberty and promise of democracy guaranteed by our written
Constitution of limited powers.
3. Have the executive branch's recent assertions of the state secrets
privilege broken from the doctrinal moorings of the Reynolds
decision?
Yes. This doctrine is a judicially created evidentiary rule that has
been expanded (and invoked numerous times by the Bush
Administration) to try to preempt or dismiss challenges to executive
branch policies. The seminal case in this area, Reynolds, reveals the
perils of allowing blanket claims of secrecy to thwart judicial review. In
that case, the widows of crewmen whose B-29 bomber crashed in 1948
sought accident reports on the crash. The Supreme Court deferred to the
Truman Administration's claim that revealing the reports would threaten
"national security" and allowed the evidence to be withheld. When the
accident reports were declassified and released almost 50 years later,
they contained no secret or national security information but they did
reveal faults in the bomber's physical condition that would have hurt the
Administration's case.
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that unchecked secrecy could
1622 [Vol. 33:5
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or would be used to cover-up errors or illegality, which is the very
danger of deference to such claims. In recent years, this defensive
"privilege" has been increasingly invoked not only to limit access to
specific pieces of evidence but also to obtain dismissal of litigation.
Recent examples include Administration motions to dismiss cases
challenging the illegal wiretapping of Americans in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and FISA by President Bush and cases challenging
the torture of individuals seized by the Administration, such as Maher
Arar, the Canadian whom the U.S. sent to Syria where he was tortured.
Arar recently received an abject apology from Canada, which reviewed
the secret evidence against him and found it so wanting the Canadian
Government paid him damages and removed his name from their watch
list.6
4. Should any responsibility for gathering domestic intelligence
remain with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
Yes. Recommendations to strip the FBI of domestic intelligence
responsibilities and transfer them to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), while well-intentioned, are infeasible and
counterproductive. DHS has thus far proven to have serious and
systemic deficiencies in some key areas (such as its catastrophic
incompetence during Hurricane Katrina). That is not to say that the
FBI's capacity is optimal-plainly, the Bureau has had severe backlogs
in translating lawful national security wiretaps, for example, and has,
most recently been found to have abused the National Security Letters
expanded by the USA PATRIOT Act. The FBI should not be singled out
for its pre-9/1 1 failures when there is plenty of blame to go around.
For example, it is plain that there was a lack of focus on al Qaeda
within the White House in 2001, as described by multiple insider
accounts. The FBI's foreign intelligence work, however, was featured in
the infamous Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) headlined "Bin Laden
Determined to Strike in U.S.," provided to President Bush on August 6,
2001. Indeed, as Ron Suskind pointed out in his book, The One Percent
Doctrine, CIA analysts were so concerned they intruded on President
Bush's August vacation at the ranch to personally brief him about the
intelligence alarms sounding that an attack was imminent. According to
Suskind, "All right," responded Bush to the panicked CIA briefer,
6. Letter from the Office of the Prime Minister of Canada to Maher Arar, (January
26, 2007), available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=l
&id=1509.
2007] 1623
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"You've covered your ass now." 7 At the same time, it is clear that the
CIA did not share all relevant information on the movement of al Qaeda
operatives with the FBI. For countless reasons, it is impossible to know
for certain if President Bush or any president could have prevented the
attack warned of in the PDB. Stripping the FBI of intelligence powers,
however, is not the right solution to detecting and thwarting future
attacks, consistent with our values.
It is worth mentioning that one of the unstated implications of the
question is whether intelligence gathering about U.S. persons should be
transferred to the military rather than committed to domestic agencies.
The military, with its vast resources and power, poses great risks to
democratic processes if its mission is allowed to creep into widespread
monitoring of civilians in the U.S. For example, we have already seen
how a Pentagon group, the Counterintelligence Field Activity charged
with counter-terrorism, compiled information on Americans who live
near military bases who oppose the war in Iraq, including religious
groups such as the Quakers, who have absolutely no connection to al
Qaeda. Such activities can easily be swept in without clear rules,
wasting resources that should be focused on genuine terrorist threats and
not squandered violating the First Amendment rights of Americans. The
military's surveillance powers are weapons of extraordinarily intrusive
power that should remain trained on al Qaeda and not directed at
Americans. The military should not be taking on domestic law
enforcement functions which are barred to it by the Posse Comitatus Act
and long standing U.S. policy. If there were evidence an American were
conspiring with al Qaeda in the U.S., it should be investigated by the FBI
which has far more institutional experience with conducting
investigations of civilians within the norms of their constitutional rights
than the military or CIA does.
As Justice Powell observed in the Keith case about Nixon's
warrantless wiretapping:
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-
however benevolent and benign its motives-to view with
suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth
Amendment protections become the more necessary when the
targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so
vague a concept as the power to protect "domestic security."
7. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PURSUIT
OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 1-2 (2006).
1624 [Vol. 33:5
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Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security interest,
the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes
apparent. 8
No matter the instrument or agency investigating, the majority correctly
observed that, "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely
within the discretion of the Executive Branch."
' 9
It is notable that "[f]oreign and domestic intelligence operations to
protect our security have always been placed in separate agencies and
under separate masters." 10  As my partner at the Center for National
Security Studies, Kate Martin, has testified:
As former intelligence and national security officials, including
former DCI Robert Gates, John Hamre and Sam Nunn urged,
"[e]ven as we merge the domestic and foreign intelligence we
collect, we should not merge responsibility for collecting
it... exclusive responsibility for authorizing and overseeing
the act of domestic intelligence collection should remain with
the Attorney General. This is the only way to protect the rights
of the American people upon whose support a strong
intelligence community depends." " I
Furthermore, Martin advised the Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities that:
As William Webster, former director of both the FBI and CIA,
testified [in August 2004] concerning proposals to transfer the
FBI's domestic intelligence authorities from the Attorney
General to an intelligence official, "the FBI should take its
guidance from the Attorney General on its dealings with U.S.
persons and the manner in which it collects information in the
United States. This has been an important safeguard for the
American people, should not be destructive of effective
operations, and avoids the risks of receiving vigilante-type
instructions, whether from the intelligence community or the
8. 409 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
9. Id. at316-17.
10. Memorandum from Kate Martin, Center for National Security Studies, to the
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction Regarding Intelligence Activities in the U.S.: Current Proposals' Risks
to Civil Liberties (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.
cnss.org/WMD%20memo%20dom%20intel.doc.
11. Kate Martin, Center for National Security Studies, Statement Before the
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/martin042805.pdf.
2007] 1625
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White House." 
12
Webster was correct to stress the importance of the FBI in domestic
intelligence as distinct from the role of the CIA. As Martin
elaborated:
The historical difference in functions between the CIA and the
FBI reflect important differences in missions and methods,
which should not be disregarded by the simplistic device of
labeling their respective activities in the U.S. and abroad as
[national security] 'intelligence' [gathering] .... The CIA acts
overseas, in secret, and its mission includes violating the laws
of the country in which it is operating when necessary. It is
charged with collecting information overseas without regard to
individual privacy, rights against self-incrimination, or
requirements for admissibility of evidence. 13
Unlike the CIA, the FBI operates domestically within the
United States and has both domestic intelligence and law
enforcement responsibilities. As Martin noted, the FBI
must always operate within the law of the jurisdiction in which
it is operating. It must respect the constitutional limits set by
the Fourth Amendment, due process and First Amendment on
government dealings with Americans and others located inside
U.S. borders .... While questions have been raised
concerning the effectiveness of various FBI efforts, those
issues do not undercut the importance of tying4 domestic
intelligence efforts to a law enforcement agency....
Accordingly, while the 9/11 Commission recommended some
structural changes to the Intelligence Community to improve
coordination, it recommended that the FBI should continue to be
responsible for domestic intelligence. As the Commission
explained, "The FBI's job in the streets of the United States would
thus be a domestic equivalent, operating under the U.S. Constitution
and quite different laws and rules, to the job of the CIA's operations
officers abroad.' 15
12. Memorandum from Kate Martin, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis in original).
15. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 423 (2004).
1626 [Vol. 33:5
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5. Does Congress have the authority, if so inclined, to regulate
wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes outside United States
territory?
Yes. The Constitution vests Congress with numerous
responsibilities relating to foreign affairs and our nation's defense in
conjunction with the President, who is charged with executing the laws
duly passed by Congress. Congress is vested with the responsibility to
appropriate and oversee funds for the operations of the executive branch,
including intelligence activities. Congress created, or ratified the
creation of, various intelligence agencies and is charged with deciding
whether or not to confirm intelligence nominees to lead those agencies.
Congress is also charged with the critical power of deciding whether to
declare war and "make rules concerning captures on land and on sea."
Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 that requires that
Congress be fully informed of the intelligence activities of the executive
branch, including overseas intelligence activities. Congress has also
sought, through FISA and other statutes, to protect the constitutional
rights of U.S. persons. Congress has held significant hearings and
investigations into such activities, and the executive branch has issued
rules to comply with what such agencies acknowledged were the
constitutional requirements. For example, presidents have issued
Executive Orders, such as EO 12,333, requiring that intelligence must be
conducted in a manner "consistent with the Constitution and applicable
law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was
founded,"' 16 although we worry that this has not provided sufficient
protection in practice, especially of late. Such rules restricted the
targeting of U.S. persons abroad and required the minimization of the
collection of information to or from Americans collected in the process
of gathering "foreign intelligence from foreign individuals or entities"
outside the U.S.
While Congress did not legislate such rules, it is clear that Congress
has a responsibility to monitor their implementation as part of its
legitimate oversight function, thus regulating foreign intelligence
wiretaps outside the U.S. Members of Congress from both parties have
recently complained, however, that the current Administration has
secretly failed to fully inform them of intelligence activities, causing a
16. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,949 (Dec. 4, 1981).
17. Michael Hayden, National Security Agency Director, Remarks Before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (April 12, 2000), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000hr/hayden.html.
2007] 1627
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constitutional crisis as well as a crisis of confidence and trust.
6. What is the next step for the majority of the detainees in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
This is a particularly complex question considering the various
categories of prisoners that have been, or are now, reportedly held there.
Al Qaeda leaders who planned the 9/11 attacks who have been captured,
such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, should be imprisoned and charged
with war crimes for planning the unlawful and despicable attacks of 9/11.
Others who were kidnapped outside of battlefields in Afghanistan or Iraq
should be charged with crimes in civilian courts here or abroad, or
released. Those who were captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan or
Iraq are entitled to due process to determine whether they are prisoners
of war, enemy combatants who took up arms against the U.S., or
innocent civilians in the wrong place at the wrong time, as some
detainees reportedly were. The U.S. simply cannot uphold the rule of
law and still claim a right to imprison anyone the President designates
indefinitely or forever without any due process of law.
7. Between Hamdi and Hamdan, which decision is most significant?
Both are very significant and I would be reluctant to choose one as
most significant. Such a determination depends on the issue at stake.
8. Between the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Director of National Intelligence, who should be responsible for
presenting covert action proposals to the National Security Council
and to the President?
The more important question is not the bureaucratic relationship
between the DCI and DNI as currently constituted, but what are the rules
governing covert actions. Congress has defined "covert action" to mean
"an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended
that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly."1 8 In 1974, Congress asserted increased control
over covert actions based on revelations about President Nixon's covert
actions in Southeast Asia. These provisions were revamped in 1984 due
to President Reagan's secret mining of Nicaraguan harbors and again in
18. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006).
1628 [Vol. 33:5
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1991 in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal.
The current binding law regarding covert actions requires that no
appropriated funds be expended by the CIA for covert actions unless the
President makes a finding that each such operation is necessary to
identifiable foreign policy objectives and gives timely notification of
such actions to Congress. Such findings must be in writing, must not be
retroactive, and must inform Congress of all agencies involved and
whether third parties will be involved. Any covert activity must not
violate the Constitution or any statutes of the U.S., and the President may
not authorize any action intended to influence U.S. political processes,
public opinion, policies, or media. Thus, the important issue is that the
President is charged with specifically authorizing any such activities and
reporting them, and any significant changes, to congressional leaders in a
timely fashion. Covert actions should be decided by policymakers after
thorough consideration of consequences, and rogue actions should not be
ratified by policymakers after the fact. The stakes are so high that such
decisions must be deliberate, clear, and focused, as well as fully
disclosed to key congressional leaders of both parties.
One of the most interesting issues in this area that has arisen of late
(aside from the question of whether the Administration is fully
complying with the National Security Act) is the possible expansion of
the Pentagon's covert activities at the direction of Donald Rumsfeld in
conjunction with Vice President Cheney, outside of the CIA's purview
and reporting. Congress needs to increase its oversight of the executive
branch in numerous areas, including Pentagon activities that do not
satisfy the exception for "traditional military activities" and that meet the
functional definition of covert action, or that attempt to skirt that
definition to thwart the law's mandatory disclosure requirements.
9. Should Congress pass a law (along the lines of H.R. 4392,
Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2001) that makes the
"unauthorized disclosure of classified information" a crime?
No. Even Attorney General John Ashcroft concluded current law is
adequate "to prosecute those who engage in unauthorized disclosures,"
according to his report of October 15, 2002.19 Current law remains
problematic from a First Amendment standpoint, however. Recent
proposals by Administration allies unfortunately seem intended to chill
19. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to Representative Dennis
Hastert (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/
dojleaks.html.
2007] 1629
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whistleblowers and the press from disclosing illegal activities of the
executive branch. Such proposals have received substantial and
warranted criticism from the public and Members of Congress-many of
whom have learned more about the Administration's illegal policies from
the press than through mandatory disclosure laws.
10. What is the most important question in national security law
today?
Can our constitutional democracy survive genuine threats
commingled with executive branch actions intended to exploit fears
about al Qaeda to arrogate unaccountable power to the office of the
President? And how will we depoliticize intelligence in the aftermath of
the extensive politicization of intelligence by the Bush White House?
The Administration's missteps and malfeasance have alienated our allies,
put wind in the sails of our enemies, and undermined the rule of law at
home, to the detriment of our security and our liberty. It is unclear how
we will repair this damage, but it is very clear that we must.
1630 [Vol. 33:5
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